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The Supremes on Religion:
How Do the Justices’ Religious Beliefs Influence their Legal Opinions?
This discussion is essentially an inquiry into the effect which religious beliefs have on the
jurisprudence of the highest court of the land, the United States Supreme Court. With regard to
actually creating laws, the Supreme Court wields an incredible amount of influence over the
judiciary by way of precedent in federal courts, and persuasive authority in state courts.
However, decisions by the most famed court in the country also mold and form the political and
social climate of eras. Supreme Court decisions have defined our nation’s history, for example
in US v. Nixon1 or Roe v. Wade.2 Thus, it seems worthwhile to explore the considerations taken
into account by the Justices when they craft opinions which will inevitably shape the course of
our national and personal histories.

It is true that the religious beliefs of the people of the United States and their elected
officials also play a leading role in the creation of laws which affect our lives; and people are
entitled to be governed and live by the rules which they chose for society. This type of lawmaking, however, is checked by the nature of our democratic republic: if the people are unhappy
with the laws by which they are required to abide, new representatives can be elected and new
laws drafted.

1
2

US v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 904 (1974).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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The law-making powers of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court are different.
Article III of the Constitution of the United States requires that there be one supreme court of the
land3, and the Justices which sit upon it are appointed by the President pursuant to Article II4.
The power of the Supreme Court was substantially increased by Marbury v. Madison5, in which
the Court bestowed upon itself the power of judicial review. In sum, a group of politically
appointed individuals have the power to make law for life, and answer (practically6) to no one.

Unlike a wheeling, dealing, and negotiating electorate body which comes to an ultimate
consensus, the Justices’ legal determinations are viewed through subjective lenses created by
unique individuals with differing life experiences. Those individual perspectives often shine
through the text of an opinion, or patterns can be found in similar opinions. To have this
discussion, an assumption must be made that religious beliefs at least somewhat inform the
decisions made by the Justices, even if only by way of secular morality7. Moreover, it is readily

3

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”)
4
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2 ([The President] shall nominate, and, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”)
5
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6
Of the 109 Justices to have served, only Samuel Chase, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, was accused of behaving badly. He was impeached on March 12, 1804, and acquitted on March 1, 1805.
RICHARD ELLIS, THE IMPEACHMENT OF SAMUEL CHASE 57-76 (Michael R. Belknap, ed., AMERICAN POLITICAL
TRIALS Praeger Publishers 1994).
7
Professor Ritter provides an excellent explanation of the ties between secular and religious morality integral to this
assumption: “The ethics of modern liberalism accordingly proclaims as its fundamental moral principle an absolute,
universal, and egalitarian regard for the value of each human being, but which refrains from reliance upon religious
belief. In its enthusiasm to elide religion from morality, secular esteem for the inherent value of human being turns
not on divine regard for the human, but on human self-regard. Such human self-regard consequently truncates the
value of human being into its autonomy: rational, independent, self-sufficient, unencumbered and unconnected to
others except by choice. For secularism, the value of being human thus becomes intrinsic to humanity – therefore
not a function of its endowment by divinity…Secular morality is a truncated version of religious morality.” Matthew
A. Ritter, The Ethics of Moral Character Determination: An Indeterminate Ethical Reflection upon Bar Admissions,
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apparent that religious belief and religion-based morality have a stronger impact on the opinions
of some Justices than others. The next logical step is to question the depth of impact made by
religious belief in informing the most powerful arbiters of law in the nation.

Thus, the aim of this discussion will be to identify how and under which circumstances
the Justices’ religious beliefs are translated into US Supreme Court opinions, how those beliefs
have influenced Supreme Court jurisprudence, and how religion will influence future
jurisprudence.

The first section of this paper will discuss the methodology used in choosing the opinions
to evaluate. The second will explain and evaluate those opinions in light of the religious beliefs
stated therein; and connect them to the opining Justice’s individual perspective. The last section
will identify trends in Supreme Court jurisprudence and, considering the perspectives of the
current Justices, predict the role of religion in future rulings.

Section 1: Methodology and Hypothesis

I suspect that because organized religion is a prevalent aspect of our society that informs
every individual’s upbringing and social perspective, it must necessarily play into a Justice’s
mindset when constructing an opinion. Determining how to evaluate the way religion has been
used in Supreme Court opinions presents two challenges: determining the inquiry’s interplay

39 Cal W. L. Rev. 1, 43 (2002) (discussing the development of morality in the US and its imposition on baradmission applicants).
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with the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, and ascertaining the distinction between
moral considerations and religious beliefs.

Although a very interesting topic, this paper will not discuss the Establishment Clause or
Free Exercise Clause. It will also not address whether the Justices’ use of their own religious
background to inform opinions is a violation of the so-called Religion Clauses.

“The Establishment Clause8 provides a certain limit to the support that government may
give to religion.”9 Conversely, the Free Exercise Clause “requires that government give religion
a certain measure of support.”10 Teasing out the Justices’ individual perspectives’ on religion as
a part of their own moral foundation from the Justices’ attitudes about the extent to which
religious practice can be proscribed in society would likely be difficult. Additionally
determining whether a Justice’s reliance on his or her own religious belief to inform an opinion
is a violation of the Establishment Clause, is too attenuated to be discussed here. However, it
would certainly be an interesting inquiry.

The second difficulty presented by this topic is finding a way to distinguish moral from
religious considerations. It is integral to this discussion that morality is somewhat drawn from
religion. See Professor Ritter’s discussion, supra note 4. However, morality legislation is
distinctive because it is reflective of societal norms which may or may not be religiously
8

U.S. CONST. art I. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause state: Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
9
John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 Calif.
L. Rev. 847, 849 (1984) (arguing that an examination of the philosophy behind the intent of the Framers in drafting
the Establishment clause is more helpful in understanding the aspirational separation of church and state than the
dicta of the U.S. Supreme Court.)
10
Id.
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motivated. Moreover, the Court has determined that a “moral norm is sufficient grounding for
government action.”11 Thus, to avoid assessing opinions which discuss morality legislation
using religious concepts (e.g. “adultery” in property hearings for divorce actions), this discussion
focuses on US Supreme Court opinions that include terms like “judeo-christian” or
“Christianity” but not in the context of Title VII or zoning regulations, for example.

The exact search terms used to identify applicable case law from LEXISNEXIS are:
“judeo-christian” or “christian-Judeo” or “judaeo-christian”, and the search string: christian or
judia! or buddhis! or islam! or jew! or muslim w/p tradition or history or heritage NOT
"establishment clause" NOT "monitor" NOT "valley forge" NOT "Title VII" NOT "religion
clauses" NOT "establishment" NOT "crucifix" NOT "commandments".

The goal of this methodology is to take into account only those circumstances in which
the opining Justice has consulted religious, not moral tenants. After ascertaining a body of
acceptable cases, I excluded those which dealt with the religion clauses or parties named one of
the key terms. Below is a summary of the search results. Please also see the graphical
representations of these results in the Appendix.

Section 2: Case Studies and Judicial Personalities

Vidal v. The Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Phila., 43 U.S. 127 (1844).

11

Bowers v. Hardwicke, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
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In 1844, Justice Roger Brooke Taney wrote the majority opinion in Vidal.12 The case
held that under the Pennsylvania Constitution, property may be bequeathed to the city of
Pennsylvania to create a college. His opinion states:

That if otherwise capable of taking effect, the trust would be void, because the
plan of education proposed is anti-Christian, and therefore repugnant to the law of
Pennsylvania….By the laws of Pennsylvania it is blasphemy to attack the
Christian religion, but in this case nothing is to be taught but the doctrines of a
pure morality, and all the advantages of early impressions upon the youthful mind
are entirely abrogated.13

Where did the favour with which charities are regarded and the motive by which
they are established spring from? The doctrine is traced up to the civil law. But
where did Justinian get these ideas? The came from Constantine, the first
Christian emperor, and they can be traced up to a higher source than that – the
Bible….The Jewish lawyer asked who his neighbor was, and it was hard to
convince him that a Samaritan could be so….Even in the older Jewish records, we
find the same lesson oh philanthropy taught were the sheaf is left for the unknown
and unacknowledged stranger.14

Roger Brooke Taney was born March 17, 1777 on the Taney Plantation on the Patuxent
River in Maryland. The Taney family had come to the colony as indentured servants but later
12

Vidal v. The Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Phila., 43 U.S. 127 (1844).
Id. at 37.
14
Id. at 48-9.
13
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established themselves as successful tobacco farmers in southern Maryland.15 Although most
settlers in the area were Protestant16, Taney grew up as a privileged English Roman Catholic of
rural gentry.17 Biographers have written that his mother was pious and gentle, but his father had
a hot temper.18 Because it was difficult to find Catholic schools in Maryland during Taney’s
childhood, and Catholics were not allowed to be teachers, Taney and his siblings were taught by
an old, self-professed Episcopal man who lived ten miles away. The only school books they
used were a spelling book, and the King James Bible.19 Taney was then instructed by a series of
tutors, one of whom was a graduate of Princeton and encouraged his attending Dickenson
College in Pennsylvania.20 He then studied law in Annapolis under the tutelage of an attorney.21
Taney was admitted to the Maryland bar on June 19, 1799. He met and married Anne Phoebe
Charlton Key, the sister of Francis Scott Key, in January, 1806. The couple would have six
daughters.

On March 28, 183622, Taney became the fifth Chief Justice and the first Catholic
appointed to the Court, despite serious Whig opposition. However, Taney’s actions in his first
decades calmed Whig apprehension that his appointment would politicize the Court. The
hallmark of Taney's tenure as Chief Justice was his opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
confirming slaves as property and then declaring that the Compromise of 1820 was

15

John Osborne and James W. Gerencser, eds., Roger Brooke Taney, DICKINSON CHRONICLES,
http://chronicles.dickinson.edu/encyclo/t/ed_taneyR.htm.
16
BERNARD C. STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY 8 (1997).
17
Hampton I. Carson, Roger B. Taney in THE LIBRARY OF HISTORICAL CHARACTERS AND FAMOUS EVENTS 343-353
(J.P. Lamberton ed.) (1909).
18
STEINER, supra note 16, at 9.
19
STEINER, supra note 16, at 10.
20
STEINER, supra note 16, at 12-13.
21
STEINER, supra note 16, at 20.
22
McNeal, James, Roger Brooke Taney, THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, May 1, 2010,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14442c.htm.
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unconstitutional. Ironically, he was personally opposed to slavery and had freed his own slaves.
Roger Brooke Taney died on October 12, 1864 at 87 years old.23

Although Taney was Roman Catholic, the thrust of his opinions do not seem to contain
religious underpinnings. In particular, the use of anti-Christian in Vidal is likely meant to
summarize Pennsylvania’s law, not to express his personal beliefs.

Thurlow v. Commonwealth of Mass., 46 U.S. 504 (1847).
In 1847, Justice John Catron wrote the majority opinion in Thurlow,24 holding that
Congress had the power to regulate importations of gin, even though Congress had made no
specific regulation. The opinion states:

[Plaintiff] commented on the various acts of the General Assembly of the State of
Rhode Island, in relation to the licensing of taverns, ale-houses, and the like, and
the sale of spirituous liquors therein…for the purpose of showing, that, from the
earliest period in the history of the Colony to the last-named period in the history
of the State of Rhode Island, her policy had been uniform on this subject, and
similar to that of most Christian and civilized countries, and of all the Colonies
and States of the Union, -- that is, to license and regulate the sale of spirituous
liquors, that it might be consistent with the preservation of good order, and with

23
24

Osborne and Gerencser, eds., Roger Brooke Taney, supra note 16.
Thurlow v. Commonwealth of Mass., 46 U.S. 504 (1847).
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the Christian virtue of temperance, and not to inhibit it, in enforcement of the
Mahometan rule of abstinence.25

John Catron was probably born in 1786, and grew up poor in Virginia and Kentucky.
Little is known of his early years.26 Catron served under General Andrew Jackson as a young
man, and forever after had similar political affinities.27

Catron joined a Court on which he was largely overshadowed by the other Justices, and
wrote fewer opinions than his colleagues.28 Although it is debated, some scholars posit it a likely
consequence of Chief Justice Taney and Catron’s shared jurisprudential outlook, which resulted
in Taney’s taking the lead on constitutional questions. Moreover, Catron did not share in the
nationalist feelings of Justice Story; the nationalism, moralism, and interest in individual rights
articulated by Justice John McLean; or, for the most part, support for states’ rights favored by
Justice Daniel.29 He thus fell into the mainstream.

With regard to the duty of judges themselves, Catron believed “that a judge ought not to
view the law as ‘a system of ethical philosophy.’30 Rather, one should approach it as set of rules

25

Thurlow, supra note 24.
A.E. Keir Nash, BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE LIVES AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF
THE JUSTICES 99 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed. 2006).
27
TIMOTHY L. HALL SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 99-1012 (2001).
28
SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES; DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, PROFESSIONAL
EXPERIENCE, AND LEGAL EDUCATION, 1789 – 2009, NO. R40802 (Congressional Research Service, 2009), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40802.pdf (indicating that other than Justice Wayne, Justice Catron averaged
the fewest number of opinions per term on the Taney Court with only 7.5).
29
Id. (citing AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE: JACKSONIAN JURISPRUDENCE
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1837–1857, at 30–35 (discussing the varied opinions of the Taney Court’s internal
critics).
30
Id. (citing AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE: JACKSONIAN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE SUPREME
COURT1837–1857, at 18).
26
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‘to maintain the ancient state of things regardless of the sanctions giving rise to it. 31’” Although
not selected for use in this paper, Catron’s opinion in State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 272–74
(1835) echoed these sentiments. Catron considered the doctrine of conquest upon which he drew
to be “in conflict with our religion, and with our best convictions of a refined and sound
morality.”32 Yet he felt compelled to invoke it: “[O]ur individual titles to lands, from the Atlantic
to the western Missouri line, depend upon its firm and unquailing support, regardless of its
origin. . . . Time and necessity have lent it their sanction; it is the law of the land.”33

Very little authoritative information is available on which religion was practiced by
Catron, if any. Foreman is a state supreme court case, but it is evident that religion played some
role in Catron’s conscience, even outside the context of morality. Therefore, it is also likely that
his personal religious beliefs led him to opine that liquor was an evil which Rhode Island had a
right to ban.

Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1840).
In 1840, Justice McLean wrote the majority opinion in Smith.34 He opined that marine
physicians were entitled to sums certain, stating: “To turn away the stranger to perish was
uncivilized and unchristian; but long experience proved that it was also unsafe.” “The perception
of this necessity, increasing wealth, a better civilization, and a larger infusion of the Christian
maxim, ‘Do as you would be done by,’...” “It is the cherished policy of the general government
to encourage and invite Christian foreigners of our own race to seek an asylum within our
31

See AUSTIN ALLEN, ORIGINS OF THE DRED SCOTT CASE: JACKSONIAN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE SUPREME COURT
1837–1857, at 18.
32
State v. Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 333 (1835).
33
Id.
34
Id. at 283.
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borders, and to convert these waste lands into productive farms, and thus add to the wealth,
population, and power of the nation.”35

Justice John McLean, often called the “Politician on the Supreme Court” was born in
1785 in Northern New Jersey.36 He came from a strong Presbyterian background owing to
familial history and a course of study taught by two schoolmasters who were also Presbyterian
ministers.37 However, just after being appointed to the U.S. Land Office in Cincinnati, McLean
met John Collins, an evangelist, who converted him to Methodism. Aided by his political
connections, McLean became the most prominent Methodist layman in the country. He was
active in church activities and wrote a series of articles about the Bible. 38

McLean was a strong supporter of the War of 1812, but was not a devout nationalist, as
evidenced by his opposition to the creation of the Second National Bank. McLean was strongly
opposed to slavery as well, and his dissent in the infamous Dred Scott decision was praised by an
Ohio news paper as one which should be ‘read with admiration.’”39 As a result of his dissent,
McLean gained a considerable amount of popularity among Northerners.40 Although not
utilizing the specific terms explored by this discussion, McLean revealed his religious leanings in
another slave case, Ohio v. Carneal, in which he stated that, slavery was inconsistent with
immutable principles of natural justice.”41 He died of pneumonia on April 4, 1861.42

35

Id. at 121-2.
1 FRANK OTTO GATELL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS 301 (Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds.) (1995).
37
Id.
38
Id. at 302.
39
Id. at 310-11.
40
Id. at 312.
41
HALL, supra note 27.
42
GATELL, supra note 36, at 312.
36
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There seems to be plenty of evidence that religion was a formidable force in Justice
McLean’s private and public life. It is likely that his Methodist leanings informed his judicial
perspective and made appearances in his opinions.

Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
Justice Field wrote the majority opinion in Davis,43 which held that statutes which
conditioned voting rights on an individual’s refusal to practice bigamy or polygamy were lawful.
The opinion states

Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of the United States, by the laws of
Idaho, and by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries; and to call their
advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind. Probably
never before in the history of this country has it been seriously contended that the
whold (sic) punitive power of the government for acts, recognized by the general
consent of the Christian world in modern times as proper matters for prohibitory
legislation, must be suspended in order that the tenets of a religious sect
encouraging crime may be carried out without hindrance.44

Justice Stephen Johnson Field served on the Court for 35 years. He was born on
November 4, 1816 to a Congregationalist minister45, and was brought up in the strict tenants of

43

Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
Id. at 343.
45
HALL, supra note 27, at 148.
44
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Calvinism.46 Field served as a missionary in modern-day Turkey from the ages of 13 to 15,47
and through being introduced to Catholics, Mahometans, Armenians, gained respect and
tolerance for other religious beliefs. 48 “In later years [religious] qualities, in a secularized form,
were duly reflected in the mind and character of Stephen; even his judicial opinions often
suggested the spirit and cadences of an Old Testament prophet.”49 Field was appointed by
Lincoln50 to serve as the tenth Justice on the Court, an addition which was suspected to be an
attempt to secure the cooperation of the Pacific states, as Field hailed from California51. Field
was most noted for his amalgamation of Constitutional principles and laissez-fair economics.

In the Slaughter House Cases, Field dissented forcefully, stating that the 14th Amendment
was not intended to write into the Constitution “the declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights,
rights which are the gift of the Creator, which the law does not confer, but only recognizes.”52 He
also wrote, “The only loyalty which I can admit consists in obedience to the Constitution and the
laws made in pursuance of it. It is only by obedience that affection and reverence can be shown
to a superior having a right to command. So thought our great Master when he said to his
disciples: ‘If ye love me, keep my commandments.’”53

46

JOHN NORTON POMEROY, SOME ACCOUNT OF THE WORK OF STEPHEN J. FIELD: AS A LEGISLATOR, STATE JUDGE,
AND JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (2003).
47
HALL, supra note 27, at 148.
48
POMEROY, supra note 46, at 10.
49
2 ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS, 530 (Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds.) (1995).
50
HALL, supra note 27, at 149.
51

Id. at 150.
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 49 at 540.
53
Id. at 539 (citing The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 105 (1873)).
52
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Field had become lame, feeble-minded and irritable, and was asked to resign from the
bench by Justice Harlan toward the end of 1896, and so did.54 He died on April 9, 1899.55

As with Justice McLean, Field’s religious propensities were obvious. Even the sentence
construction within the Davis opinion makes clear that he saw religious sentiment as being
distinct from moral or social inclinations: “crimes…of the United States,… laws of Idaho,… the
laws of all civilized and Christian countries…” Moreover, he opines that the Mormon faith is
depraved in its teachings (“and to call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common
sense of mankind”), suggesting that Christianity is superior to the Church of Latter-Day Saints.56

Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
In Marcus,57 Justice Holmes wrote a majority opinion which upheld a law that required
landlords to provide tenants basic light, heat, and water services. He opined

Some of our opponents have indulged at some length in citations from historians.
They have also referred to alleged responsa of rabbis rendered in mediaeval
times, in their capacity as arbitrators….The very fact that the Jews, in the days
when these arbitraments took place, could not own real property of itself indicates
how far afield these alleged precedents are apt to lead one.”58

54

Id. at 548.
HALL, supra note 27, at 151.
56
This is ironic because followers of the Church of Latter-Day Saints proclaim themselves to be Christian. See Jeff
Lindsay, Are Latter-day Saints Christian? Certainly!, LDS FAQ, Feb. 24, 2007,
http://www.jefflindsay.com/LDSFAQ/FQ_Christian.shtml.
57
Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
58
Id.
55
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Oliver Wendell Holmes was born in Boston on March 8, 1841. Holmes’ father was a
famous doctor, and his mother was a daughter of a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts.59 Holmes was well educated, attending Harvard and becoming a member of its
Metaphysical Club. He also served three years in the army which deeply ingrained his natural
propensity toward skepticism.60 Holmes’ grandfather was a Congregationalist minister, but no
other reference is made to his participation in organized religion.61 It does not seem that Holmes
was a religious man. Rather, he believed, for example, that transgression of criminal law did not
evidence a moral defect, but instead simple failure to measure up to community standards.62

Holmes served for twenty years on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and wrote
almost 1,300 opinions.63 He was appointed to the United States Supreme Court by President
Theodore Roosevelt in 1902 and served an additional 29 years.64 He was considered by many a
radical empiricist, and some of his opinions have come under attack in recent years.65 He
resigned in 1932 and died three years later.66

Even if one were to disregard Holmes’ apparent lack of religious conviction, his use of
the term “Jews” in Marcus Brown Holdings is likely nothing more than an assessment of the
historic treatment of the subject. That Holmes was ideologically wedded to empiricism is further
evidence that religion did not play a role in his determination.
59

3 PAUL A. FREUND, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS
874 (Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds.) (1995).
60
Id. at 875.
61
G. EDWARD WHITE, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: SAGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 18 (2000).
62
FREUND, supra note 59, at 876.
63
Id. at 877.
64
Id. at 880.
65
Id. at 874 see e.g. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)(a case grounded in relativity to the dismay of
natural –law thinkers)).
66
Id. at 881.
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Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
In 1956, Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in Ullman,67 in which the majority
held that Congress’s interest in national security trumped even the important grant of immunity
against state prosecution. Douglas’ dissenting opinion explains the genesis of immunity:

[The defendant] marshalled many arguments against the oath ex officio, one of
them being the sanctity of conscience and the dignity of man before God: as for
that Oath that was put upon me, I did refuse to take it as a sinful and unlawful
oath, and by the strength of my God enabling me, I will never take it, though I be
pulled in pieces by wild horses, as the antient Christians were by the bloody
tyrants in the Primitive Church; neither shall I think that man a faithful subject of
Christ's kingdom, that shall at any time hereafter take it, seeing the wickedness of
it hath been so apparently laid open by so many, for the refusal whereof many do
suffer cruel persecution to this day."68

A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoires of a Woman of Pleasure” (Fanny Hill) v.
A.G. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
Douglas also wrote a concurring opinion in Fanny Hill, in which the majority held that
because a controversial book had some literary value, it should not be proscribed. Douglas’
concurrence states:

67
68

Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
Ullman at 446 (citing The Trial of Lilburn and Wharton, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315, 1332).
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He readily admits that the traditional Judeo-Christian standards of conduct and
behavior no longer serve as strong and forceful guides.…[T]he values contained
in the Judeo-Christian tradition and ‘the American way of life’ must never be
abandoned for they emanate from the wellsprings of ‘Truth.’ What has previously
been only an external force must now be internalized by individuals. [T]he story
of Fanny Hill is a tragedy because she did not demonstrate self-control. She
refused to internalize the values inherent in the Judeo-Christian tradition and the
catalog of sexual scenes in the book, fifty-two in all, are a symbol of the debased
individual and the society in which he lives.69

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Douglas also wrote a concurring opinion in Furman, which held that sentencing mentally
retarded criminals to death constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The danger of subjective judgment is acute if the question posed is whether a
punishment shocks the most fundamental instincts of civilized man…or whether a
cry of horror would rise from every civilized and Christian community of the
country….

69

A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memories of a Woman of Pleasure” (Fanny Hill) v. A.G. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413,
435-46 (1966).
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The House of Lords rejected his petition, but a minority of its members concluded
that the King's Bench had no jurisdiction to compel defrocking and that the other
punishments were barbarous, inhumane, unchristian, and unauthorized by law.70

William Orville Douglas was born in 1898 in Minnesota to a Presbyterian
minister. The family moved to Washington, and Douglas’ father died. He left Douglas
impoverished and crippled by polio.71 Douglas attended Columbia Law School and had two
children with Mildred Riddle. Douglas and Riddle divorced in 1953. Interestingly, he remarried
three times: when he was 56 to Mercedes Davidson; when he was 65 to Joan Martin, 25; and
when he was 68 to Cathleen Hefferman, 22.72

Douglas was generally known as an aggressive civil libertarian, and fought for the rights
of minorities and outcasts.73 He was an avid hiker and environmentalist, and was frequently
criticized for shirking his judicial duties or writing sloppy opinions.74 Supporters, however, tout
Douglas for his “power to emphasize with brevity.”75 Conservatives disliked Douglas for his
support of judicial activism and Gerald Ford, then the Republican leader of the House of
Representatives attempted to impeach Douglas and failed.76 Despite significant experience
writing about many areas of the law, it is supposed that Douglas’ greatest contribution to
70
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Supreme Court jurisprudence is in the area of individual liberty. On December 13, 1974,
Douglas suffered a stroke from which he never fully recovered. He retired in 1975 and died in
1980.77
Although Douglas apparently had a religious upbringing, at least before his father died,
religion does not seem to have played a large role in his adult life. The reference to God and
religion in Douglas’ dissent in Ullman was likely meant to strengthen the respect for the
antiquity of the privilege Douglas sought to defend. That is was a religious reference is
seemingly irrelevant to the case at hand.

In Fanny Hill, Douglas is not referencing religious beliefs at all, other than to compare
the controversial nature of the book in question to general standards of acceptability.

In Furman, Douglas is comparing Christian treatment of proper punishment to that which
guided society at the time of his writing. With regard to the first use of “Christian” in the
concurrence, Douglas’ inclusion of the second clause, which is religiously oriented despite
having used perfectly explanatory and nonsecular verbiage directly before, sheds light on his
religious convictions. (“…(1) shocks the most fundamental instincts of civilized man…(2) or
whether a cry of horror would rise from every civilized and Christian community of the
country…”) A similar assessment may be made of the second use of “Christian”. Because
Douglas clearly identified the standard to be used in making a determination of what was
socially acceptable, there was no need to also use a religious reference. (“…punishments were
barbarous, inhumane, unchristian, and unauthorized by law.”)
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Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
The famed Justice Hugo Black wrote a dissenting opinion in Bartkus,78 in which the
majority held that no double jeopardy was present because successive trials did not deny the
petitioner due process. He wrote

Even in the Dark Ages, when so many other principles of justice were lost, the
idea that one trial and one punishment were enough remained alive through the
canon law and the teachings of the early Christian writers…Few principles have
been more deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.79

Justice Hugo Lafayette Black was born on February 27, 1886 in Harlan, Alabama. He is
widely held to be one of the Supreme Court’s most influential justices. Black was a strict
textualist, utilizing this view to protect personal liberties from government infringement.80 His
parents were farmers, and later keepers of a general store. The general store afforded Black
close proximity to political and legal conversation.81

Black served as a senator and made it apparent that he supported Roosevelt’s courtpacking plan. This, along with other shared perspectives, likely earned Black’s appointment to
the Court in 1937.82 Black was also a member of the Ku Klux Klan, but renounced his
association upon appointment.83 Oddly, Black’s first client had been a black man who, as was
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the custom, was leased out to perform labor under slave-like conditions. Black defended him
vigorously and won a verdict of $137.50. 84

There is no authoritative indication of which religion practiced by Black, other than that
the Bible and Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress were the two most read books of his childhood.85
Black once commented that the Bible was the only book his mother ever read to him.86
Additionally, he had the support of the Baptists during his Senate campaigns,87 and his family’s
genesis in the so-called “Bible Belt” indicates that he was probably Baptist. Whatever Black’s
religious affiliation, it seems as though his upbringing was at least influenced by religious
thought.

Black’s dissenting opinion in Bartkus seems consistent with his interest in criminal
procedure. Black’s religious influences seem few, if any, and the above statement seems to be a
reflection on society’s moral influences, as opposed to his own religious beliefs. Moreover, use
of “Christian” in response to the authors of the texts from which he draws seems, from the
context of the case, nothing more than an identification of a source, not an offering of a
particular belief system.

Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)

84
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In Calero-Toledo,88 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held that a company was
not deprived of due process or just compensation because the seizure of its interest in a yacht
was necessary to secure an important governmental interest. The opinion states “The origins of
the deodand are traceable to the Biblical and pre-Judeo-Christian practices, which reflected the
view that the instrument of death was accused and that religious expiation was required.”89

Justice William J. Brennan was born on April 25, 1906, the son of an Irish coal miner,
who later became active in the union politics of Newark, New Jersey.90 His family was
Catholic.91 Brennan was a liberal, but managed to politik his way into dissenting an average of
only six times per year, despite the conservative stance of the rest of the court.92 Interestingly, he
has said that, despite media and the Bush administration’s labels, he does not view himself as an
extreme liberal, especially compared to Black and Douglas.93 In speech given at Georgetown
University, Brennan commented, “[T]he genius of the Constitution rests not in any static
meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and current needs.”94

Here, Brennan is simply tracing the development of forfeiture law. The religious
referenced used in Calero-Toledo serves to establish its long and embedded history in our
culture.
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Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)
Harris95 held that Medicaid abortions not funded by Congress due to the Hyde
Amendment, and other funding restrictions on abortions, did not violate the Establishment
Clause or the Fifth Amendment. Justice Stewart’s majority opinion notes that

the Judaeo-Christian religions oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the
Federal Government may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact
laws prohibiting larceny. The Hyde Amendment, as the District Court noted, is as
much a reflection of ‘traditionalist’ values towards abortion, as it is an
embodiment of the views of any particular religion. In sum, …[the] restrictions in
the Hyde Amendment may coincide with the religious tenets of the Roman
Catholic Church...96

Potter Stewart was born in Jackson, Michigan, the son of James Garfield Stewart, a chief
justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.97 His religious background is Episcopalian.98 He was
appointed to the US Supreme Court when he was only 39. On the Warren Court, Stewart
frequently stood outside the prevailing liberal consensus, particularly on matters concerning state
criminal law enforcement. His centrist inclinations meant, however, that he also declined to align
himself with the Burger court's occasionally aggressive pursuit of politically conservative
causes.99
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While Justice Stewart may not be infusing the opinion with his own religious beliefs, he
is certainly recognizing the role of religion in making the law. Perhaps his religious background
has influenced his perspective on whether religion has a place in law-making.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
Bowers100 was written by Justice White, and held that the Due Process Clause did not
confer upon homosexuals, a fundamental right to practice homosexual sodomy. Justice
Blackmun dissented, stating:

I believe we must analyze respondent Hardwick's claim in the light of the values
that underlie the constitutional right to privacy. If that right means anything, it
means that, before Georgia can prosecute its citizens for making choices about the
most intimate aspects of their lives, it must do more than assert that the choice
they have made is an abominable crime not fit to be named among Christians.101

Moreover, he opined that

[t]he assertion that traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe the conduct
involved, Brief for Petitioner 20, cannot provide an adequate justification for
[Georgia’s statute]. That certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn
the behavior at issue gives the State no license to impose their judgments on the
entire citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on whether

100
101

Bowers at 186.
Id. at 199-200.
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the State can advance some justification for its law beyond its conformity to
religious doctrine.102

In footnote, he includes:

The parallel between Loving and this case is almost uncanny. There, too, the State
relied on a religious justification for its law…that Almighty God created the races
white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. . .
. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to
mix[.] …Petitioner…rel[ied] on the Old and New Testaments and the writings of
St. Thomas Aquinas to show that traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe
such conduct[.]103

Justice Byron White is one of the more mysterious characters to have served on the
United States Supreme Court. He was born in Fort Collins, Colorado in 1917. There is very
little authoritative information available about his upbringing, except that he grew up in the small
sugar-beet farming town of Wellington where his father managed a lumberyard and was the
mayor.104 Some less reliable sources indicate that White was either Episcopalian or Anglican.105
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White went on to play a variety of collegiate sports, and ultimately played a year of
football for the Pittsburg Pirates. A Rhodes Scholar, White spent a year at Oxford before joining
the US Navy after Pearl Harbor was attacked. White also organized President John F.
Kennedy’s presidential campaign in Colorado. Kennedy then appointed White to the Supreme
Court.106 Despite being appointed by a democratic administration, White frequently sided with
the conservative side of the court, for example, dissenting in Roe v. Wade, and again in Casey.107

White’s reasoning in Bowers, cited above, clearly states that religious belief cannot be
exported to the rest of society, even though he ultimately determined that Georgia’s law should
not be struck down. White’s view is commensurate with the impact that religion seems to have
had on his life.

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993)
In Austin,108 Justice Blackmun held that the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause
applied to drug-related property forfeiture to the United States. In his opinion for the majority,
he wrote:

Three kinds of forfeiture were established in England at the time the Eight
Amendment was ratified in the United States: deodand, forfeiture upon conviction
of felony or treason, and statutory forfeiture. Each was understood, at least in
part, as imposing punishment…. The origins of deodand are traceable to Biblical
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and pre-Judeo-Christian practices, which reflected the view that the instrument of
death was accused and that religious expatriation was required.109

Justice Blackmun was born on November 12, 1908 in the same room in which his mother
had been born. His parents had met at a Methodist university, Central Wesleyan College.110 His
childhood had been scarring; his father had trouble holding a job and his mother worried
constantly about the family’s financial well-being. Blackmun graduated summa cum laude from
Harvard undergraduate and law school, despite holding a multitude of jobs to supplement his
scholarship.

Blackmun was appointed to the Court by Richard Nixon in 1970. An affection for the
disadvantaged, the underdogs, and the poor, marked Blackmun’s twenty-four year tenure on the
court. A feeling of solidarity with the “little people” was most evident when he exclaimed,
“Poor Joshua!” in DeShaney v. Winnebego County Department of Social Services.111 He
frequently alluded to feeling like an outsider on the Court, but gained fame and notoriety for
opinion in Roe v. Wade. He had to travel with security detail and a bullet was once shot into his
apartment.

As in Calero-Toledo,112 the purpose of the religious reference utilized by Blackmun is not
tied to a religious belief, but rather traces the history of forfeiture law.
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Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000)
Rice held that one may not be prevented from exercising the right to vote based on his
ancestry, because the ancestral inquiry created a race-based voting qualification in violation of
the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy, opining for the majority, wrote, “[New England
Congregationalists] sought to teach Hawaiians to abandon religious beliefs and customs that
were contrary to Christian teachings and practices.”113

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
Atkins v. Virginia held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment was violated by the execution of mentally retarded criminals. Both Justices
Stevens and Rehnquist’s opinions are relevant to this paper’s inquiry. Stevens opined for the
majority

In addition, representatives of widely diverse religious communities in the United
States, reflecting Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist traditions, have filed an
amicus curiae brief explaining that even though their views about the death
penalty differ, they all ‘share a conviction that the execution of persons with
mental retardation cannot be morally justified.114

Justice Rehnquist references the above portion of the majority opinion, saying that none
of the amicus briefs should be given any weight when the legislature has chosen not to do so.115
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Justice John Paul Stevens was the only protestant on the Roberts court.116 He was born
into a prominent Chicago family, the youngest of four sons.117 Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist
grew up in a conservative Lutheran118 household in Milwaukie, Wisconsin. His father was a
paper salesman, and his mother a translator. Rehnquist enlisted in the army during World War II
and utilized GI Bill scholarship money to attend Stanford. He was very conservative and had
served many posts for the Republican party.119 Rehnquist’s unattained, but well documented
goal was to overturn Roe v. Wade.120

In their opinions, neither justice is importing their own religious beliefs. Rather, they are
assessing whether amicus briefs are relevant in light of our law-making system.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
The majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas121 was written by Justice Kennedy. It held
that the convictions of two adults for consensual homosexual sodomy under a Texas statute
violated their due process liberty and privacy interests. Kennedy’s opinion references Bowers v.
Hardwick, and states
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The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of Western
Civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not take
account of other authorities pointing in an opposite direction.122

Anthony McLeod Kennedy was born and raised in Sacramento, California. His father
worked his way through law school as a dock worker, then built a lobbying and law practice.
Kennedy attended Stanford University and the London School of Economics, then Harvard Law
School. He accepted a job with a law firm in San Francisco, but returned to Sacramento to take
charge of his father's firm after his death in 1963.123
Kennedy is Catholic124, but stated during an interview,

Our system presumes that there are certain principles that are more important than
the temper of the times...And you must have a judge who is detached, who is
independent, who is fair, who is committed only to those principles, and not
public pressures of other sort. That's the meaning of neutrality.125
In the above opinion, Kennedy is rejecting Chief Burger’s use of religious standards to
justify morality legislation. Kennedy’s quote about neutrality indicates that, even if he did
strongly espouse religious tenants, he would try not to let them skew his legal judgments. This
seems to be the unspoken practice of most of the justices discussed in this paper. Thus far, there
has been very little use of personal religious beliefs in Supreme Court opinions.
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Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Dep’t of Ed., 550 U.S. 81 (2007)
Zuni Public School District No. 89126 held that the Secretary of Education, in determining
which school districts to disregard in calculating disparity in per-pupil expenditures among
state’s states districts pursuant to the Federal Impact Aid Program, was allowed to look to the
number of the district’s pupils. Justice Scalia dissented, stating

In Church of the Holy Trinity,127 every Justice on this Court disregarded the plain
language of a statute that forbade the firing of clergyman from abroad because,
after all (they thought), ‘this is a Christian nation,’ so Congress could not have
meant what it said.128

Justice Antonin Scalia is “one of the most provocative and controversial public officials
in modern times.”129 Scalia, called “Nino”, was born in 1936 in New Jersey. His father was a
professor, and the family moved to Queens, New York, for a job at Brooklyn College. His
mother was also a school teacher. His parents were also both devout Roman Catholics. As a
result, Scalia attended an all boy’s Catholic military prep school, St. Francis Xavier High School.
It is well known in Manhattan. William Stern, a friend and classmate, who later went on to run
Mario Cuomo’s 1982 gubernatorial campaign said about Scalia: “This kid was a conservative
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when he was 17 years old. An archconservative Catholic. He could have been a member of the
Curia. He was a top student in the class. He was brilliant, way above everybody else.”130

Scalia married Maureen McCarthy, also a devout Catholic. The couple have nine
children. They have also been known to leave churches where they perceive the practices as
being too liberal.131 On the Court, Scalia’s propensities have been similar. He strongly criticizes
pragmatic approaches to decision making, and instead supports rule of law.

Across a wide range of issues, including abortion, homosexual rights,
church-state issues, and the death penalty, Scalia charges his colleagues with
imposing their ‘elite’ values on the majority of people.132

For Scalia, these sorts of judicially created tests erode traditional moral values and
allow the Court to engage in policy making. Scalia has also been willing to
criticize the analysis used by his colleagues in particular cases and often uses
words like ‘irrational’ ‘absurd’ or ‘ludacris’ in describing their opinions.133

Justice Scalia is the most religious justice to sit on the modern supreme court. As is
evident from his biography and his comment in Holy Trinity, Scalia is more committed to the
rule of law than pragmatic decision making or personal prejudice. Although there is some
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connection between religion and conservatism, Scalia’s legal perspective seems to be strictly
conservative and not informed by religion.

Section 3: Trends and Predictions

In conclusion, the experiment conducted in this paper is a failed one. Instead of utilizing
biographies of the justices to shed light on the possible religious underpinnings which influence
the text of their opinions, the methodology encouraged attenuated linking based on too little
information.

First, there is very little information available about the justices’ experiences with
religion. For the earlier justices, this is likely a product of poor recordkeeping, or lack of interest
in the subject when more information was available. With regard to more recent justices, there
seems to be an intentional lack of focus on their personal, as opposed to professional lives.
Information seems to become more available once the justice enters the public arena. As such, it
is impossible to obtain enough information to determine how such a bias would manifest itself in
their writing, if at all.

The second problem which arose involved how the analyzed cases were chosen. The
search methodology is detailed in Section 1, above. A problem is that word proximity is only
one indication of relatedness. It is likely that a great number of cases were missed that discuss
religion in a context which would be appropriate for this paper, because the search method was
under inclusive. The other problem was choosing the right terms an excluding the right terms.
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For example, “Catholic” and “Jewish” tend to come up in the context of the Establishment
Clause, which was not meant to be discussed. By excluding cases where “Catholic” is in the
same sentence as “Establishment,” cases were omitted that were irrelevant, and probably some
which would have been informative.

For example, in Bowers above, Justice White notes,

The parallel between Loving and this case is almost uncanny. There, too, the State relied on a
religious justification for its law…that Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. . . . The fact that he separated the
races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix[.] …Petitioner…rel[ied] on the Old and
New Testaments and the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas to show that traditional Judeo-Christian
values proscribe such conduct[.]134

yet Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) was not included in the search results.

Given the opportunity to conduct this research again, I would probably have chosen a
handful of cases which espouse religious tenants, and conducted in depth research on the opining
justices and their other opinions. Alternatively, I’d have chosen a single justice who has a
reputation for being unusually religious, Scalia for example, and tracked whether those religious
leanings were manifested in their work. Simply put, the question deserves more focused
analysis.
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It may simply be the case that justices’ religious beliefs do not play a role in their
assessment of the law. “The practical reality of life in America is that religion plays much less
of a role in everyday life than it did 50 or 100 years ago,135” “These days, we’ve moved to other
sources of diversity,” including race, gender and ethnicity.136

That move reflects a profound shift in the way we think about law, and in the very
meaning of identity politics…. [S]ociety seems to demand that the court carry a
certain demographic mix. It is hard to imagine the court without a black justice,
for instance, and it may well turn out that Justice Sonia Sotomayor is sitting in a
new “Hispanic seat.” It would surprise no one if President Obama tried to increase
the number of women on the court to three. Not so long ago, there was similar
casual talk, but of a “Catholic seat” or a “Jewish seat” on the Supreme Court.
Today, the court is made up of six Roman Catholics, two Jews and Justice
Stevens. It was not ever thus.137
“Historically, religion was huge…it was up there with geography as the key factor.”138

Other writers have uncovered similar results: that background, ideology, and other nonlegal factors are less influential in judicial decision-making than is suggested by social
scientists.139 However, research on religious decision-making in lower courts is being
conducted. It seems as though the religious background of judges and parties to a claim are the

135

Liptak, supra note 116 (quoting Professor Geoffrey R. Stone of University of Chicago).
Liptak, supra note 116 (quoting Professor Lee Epstein of Northwestern University).
137
Liptak, supra note 116.
138
Id. (quoting Professor Lee Epstein of Northwestern University).
139
Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical
Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 743 (2005).
136

Glasofer

Page 35

most indicative and correlated factors to outcomes.140
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